

\°» ^ 


Calendar Mo* 86 


62 d Congress, 
1st Session. 


SENATE. 


j Kept. 100, 
I Part 2. 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


July 24, 1911.—Ordered to be printed. 

July 26, 1911.—Ordered reprinted with corrections. 

Li.S. V”? 2»ic- , 

Mi. Owen, from the Committee on Territories, submitted the 

following 

VIEWS. 

[To accompany H. J. Res. 14.] 

I have joined in the favorable report of the Committee on Territories 
approving House joint resolution 14, providing for the admission of 
lNlev, Mexico and Arizona, as amended. 

I do not believe, however, that the words “at his request” in sec¬ 
tion 4, page 6 line 22, which appear in line 1, page 7, of the Senate 
punting, snouid be struck out, because I think the individual voter 

S uhX a r i r ^ le an< l have enough intelligence to ask for it. 

I he slight amendment proposed by the committee in section 4 
merely provides for the additional protection of the ballot in New 
Mexico by preventing what is known as the “endless chain” I 
should have preferred the greater safeguards suggested in an amend¬ 
ment which I proposed to the committees a modified form of the 
Australian ballot, which has been found so essential in other States 
to prevent fraudulent voting. In my anxiety to see New Mexico 
admitted without further delay and to see the people of New Mexico 
given a speedy opportunity of self-government, and in saying for 
themselv es, as fai as it is practicable under their lax methods, whether 
they should be allowed to easily amend their own constitution, I 
have not insisted on amendments which might jeopardize their 
speedy admission. I think Congress is responsible for an honest 
election in both these Territories, and I propose an amendment as 
follows: 

After line 8, page 12, insert: 

Any bribery or coercion, in holding the election in New Mexico or Arizona, of the 
voter, or attempt to bribe such voter, shall constitute a misdemeanor, punishable by 
five hundred dollars fine, one-half to go to the informer, and it shall be the duty of 
the United States attorneys resident in New Mexico or Arizona to prosecute all such 
cases presented to them, at the expense of the United States. No informant giving 
information of bribery or coercion shall be subject to any punishment on the charge 
of having received a bribe. 


1 I3 - J 












2 


ADMISSION OF AFJZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


I must express my regret that it should appear to be believed that 
an Australian-ballot amendment and corrupt-practices provision assur¬ 
ing an honest vote in New Mexico might be used as a pretext by those 
who are opposed to the admission of Arizona and New Mexico to delay 
the act of admitting these Territories. 

I submit this expression of my own views because I think there 
should be put upon the record an answer to the views of the Senator 
from Minnesota (Mr. Nelson), who I understand speaks for himself, 
and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Lippitt), and the Senator 
from New Hampshire (Mr. Burnham). 

Senator Nelson moved to strike out that portion of the House joint 
resolution admitting Arizona, on the ground that lie did not approve 
permitting the people of Arizona to be admitted into the Union with 
a constitution giving the people the power of determining whether or 
not they should have the right, by majority vote, to recall judges; 
and that he did not approve a constitution permitting 15 per cent of 
the voters of Arizona to initiate a constitutional amendment which 
might be approved or disapproved by a majority of the people of 
Arizona voting thereon. 

THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

If there is any principle which ought to be recognized in the United 
States, it is the right of a State admitted on equal terms with other 
States to exercise the right of self-government. The Senator from 
Minnesota would deny the right of self-government to the people of 
Arizona, above referred to, because he thinks they would not exer¬ 
cise it wisely and ought not to be permitted to declare such right of 
self-government. He would substitute his wisdom for the wisdom 
of an entire State, and takes issue with them on the exercise by the 
people of Arizona of the power to declare in their proposed consti¬ 
tution the right of recall and the right of the majority to amend the 
constitution of the State on the initiative of 15 per cent of the people 
of the State. 

I feel obliged to put in the record my protest against this unpro¬ 
gressive doctrine actuating the views of the Senators from Minnesota, 
Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. 

Even in the State of the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Nelson, 
by the constitution of 1857, section 3, article 6, “The judges of 
the supreme court shall be elected by the electors of the State at 
large, and their terms of office shall be six years.” It, therefore, 
follows that the judges being chosen by the body of the people are 
subject to control by the people, and the term of office being lim¬ 
ited to six years they are automatically recalled at the end of six 
years by the termination of the short tenure fixed by the people, 
■even if they have served with “good behavior.” 

In the State of the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Lippitt, 
the judges are elected under the constitution of 1842, section 4, 
article 10, by the representatives of the people in the general assem¬ 
bly meeting in grand committee, and the recall of the judges in 
Rhode Island is provided by a resolution of the general assembly to 
that effect, without imputing any reason for the recall; and in 
the State of the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Burnham, the 
judges are also subject to recall by resolution of the general assem- 



"-"I 




ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


3 


resolution of 

X Indeed, Mr. President, it is of great interest to observe the manner 
in which people of the various States have exercised control over 
the judges in the respective States. Only five States provide for the 
appointment of the judges by the governor and senate or council, to 
wit, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
and New Jersey, but even in these Delaware has the term of 12 years, 
Maine a term of 7 years, Mississippi a term of 9 years, New Jersey 7 
years; and Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hamp¬ 
shire all provide for the recall of judges during their term by an 
address of the legislature. 

All of the other forty-six States elect their judges for fixed terms by 
the qualified electors of the State, except Rhode Island, South Caro¬ 
lina, Vermont, and Virginia, which elect by the general assembly. I 
insert the manner of election or appointment of judges in the respec¬ 
tive States as an exhibit to this report (Exhibit A), and also the pro¬ 
visions in the various State constitutions relating to the recall of 
judges, which show that every State in the Union holds a firm hand 
over their judges; 36 States elect the judges by vote of the people, 
4 States elect judges by the General Assembly, and 5 States appoint 
by the Governor—and four of the latter have the express right of 
recall by the general assembly—but 43 States elect for fixed terms, 
generally short terms. Thirty-two States recall by the general 
assembly. On]} r three States elect during good behavior, Massa¬ 
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, all three having the 
express right of recall by the general assembly. It will be thus seen 
by what a firm hand the people control the State judges by fixed 
and short tenure and by the recall through the general assembly and 
by the people directly. 

New Hampshire appoints during good behavior, but has the right 
of recall by the legislature. All judges may be recalled by impeach¬ 
ment in all of the States. Every State which has the tenure “during 
good behavior” sets the example to the United States of providing 
the recall of such judges by the legislature. 


> bly, and they have been recalled four different times by 
x the assembly. 


THE RIGHT OF RECALL. 

Prior to 1688 the judges on the King’s bench of Great Britain, led 
by the infamous Jeffreys, had the temerity to declare void acts of Par¬ 
liament, but after the Revolution of 1688, to which this was one of 
the contributing causes, Parliament provided that judges should not 
be removed by the Crown except upon an address of Parliament. In 
other words, the English people provided for the recall of the judges 
upon an address of Parliament and took from the King the undue con¬ 
trol of the judiciary, which had become oppressive of the people in the 
interest of the Crown. The judges of history have often shown by 
their decisions that they knew who had the sovereign power over them 
and have shown themselves capable of serving the sovereign. The 
best sovereign is the people, and judges when in doubt may well 
resolve the doubt in the interest of the people. 

And all of our own States, at the time of the framing of the Con¬ 
stitution of the United States, exercised the most direct control over 
the judges on the bench. In eight States the term of office of judges 





4 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


was fixed “during good behavior/” to wit, New Hampshire, Massa¬ 
chusetts, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia. Only New Hampshire and Massachusetts retain the tenure 
“during good behavior ” and New Hampshire recalls and has re¬ 
called four times, and Massachusetts retains the same right. 

In many States the legislature directly elected the judiciary, as in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Delaware, New Jersey, \ ir- 
ginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, and in many States the judiciary 
was subject to recall by an address to the executive of the legislature, 
as in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland, Delaware, South 
Carolina, and Pennsylvania, and this method of controlling the judi¬ 
ciary is now exercised by twenty eight States of the Union. When 
the Constitution was framed, three other States—Rhode Island, Con¬ 
necticut, and Georgia—automatically recalled their judges by a short 
tenure of office of one year, thus providing against judges becoming 
tyrannical or independent of public opinion, and forty-three States 
now have fixed or short terms of office. 

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES REACTIONARY AS COM¬ 
PARED WITH THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 


When the Constitution of the United States was established, 
Hamilton made the argument that judges should be chosen for life, 
on the ground that the life tenure had worked so well in England, # 
and concealed the fact in his argument that the judges in England 
could be recalled by an address of Parliament. The consequence 
was that the Conservatives, who were in control of the Constitutional 
Convention, established a Federal judiciary for life, without any 
expressed means of recall, except impeachment, making it possible to 
contend that the judiciary was independent of the people and respon¬ 
sible to no practical control by Congress or by the Executive, for 
impeachment is so difficult as to be confessedly valueless. 

This policy was favored by those who wanted to protect the 
wealthy classes against the possible aggression of citizens who did 
not belong to the very rich class, and thereafter the advocates of 
special privilege industriously impressed the country with the idea 
that the Constitution was a very democratic instrument; that it was 
the best organic form of making effective the principles of the Decla¬ 
ration of Independence, when, in reality, in certain very important 
particulars, it was irreconcilable with the Declaration of Independ¬ 
ence. For example, the Declaration of Independence declares: 


That all men are created equal , that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed , that whenever any form of government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it , and to institute 
new government , laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in 
such form as to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness. 

The Declaration of Independence means the majority rule. It was 
described and explained as the right of the majority to rule. It 
means this, and it means nothing less than this. The consent of the 
governed is the consent of the majority of the governed, and not the 
consent of a minority, and yet the Constitution of the United States 
has been so artfully framed as to enable the minority to rule and to 
prevent the majority from ruling, for example: 







ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


5 


.The majority of the people of the United States and of the indi¬ 
vidual States have long desired to provide for the election of United 
States Senators by direct vote of the people for the plain reason that 
the Senate had become the bulwark of 'privilege. They have tried for a 
hundred years to write this law to conform with the rule of the 
majority and have been artfully and steadily defeated by a minority. 

I have heretofore shown (on May 31, 1910) that 37 States had peti¬ 
tioned Congress for this reform, or had established the selection of 
Senators by direct primary, and yet a small minority had been able 
to defeat the will of the majority through the constitutional obstruc¬ 
tions placed in the Constitution and through a like rule of the minor¬ 
ity in the several States. Senators on the floor of the United States 
Senate have thus defied or evaded the wishes of the majority of the 
people in their own States and of the majority of the people of the 
United States. They have done this because they were actually rep¬ 
resentatives of special interests, of a minority of the people in their 
own States, which minority, through the political machine, by mi¬ 
nority methods well understood, have usurped the governing function. 

A fraction over one- hird of the House of Representatives, under 
the Constitution of the United States, has been able to prevent any 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States, because it 
requires two-thirds or more of the House to submit an amendment to 
the States (Art. V). A fraction over one-third of the Senate has 
been able to obstruct any amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. Thus a minority, either in House or Senate, could 
overrule the majority. 

Moreover, a minority of the people can nominate Members of 
Congress in the States, and elect them by machine methods, and by 
the chief weapon of the minority—corrupt practices. In this way 
by a minority vote in individual States, Representatives can be 
nominated and sent to Congress, and Senators who actually represent 
minorities in individual States, can rule the majority of all the people 
in all the States, as a minority either in the House or in the Senate. 

It is against this sinister minority rule that I protest. It is against 
minority rule and in favor of majority rule that I submit these views, 
in answer to the Senator from Minnesota, who in the manner pro¬ 
posed opposes majority rule in Arizona and who, therefore, favors 
minority rule, because government must be conducted either by the 
minority or majority. For this reason he applauds the extreme 
difliculty imposed by the constitution of New Mexico to its amend¬ 
ment. A variety of minorities can prevent the majority, from 
amending the New Mexico constitution, and the Senator from Minne¬ 
sota thinks this a great virtue, and demands that the Flood resolu¬ 
tion, enabling the people of New Mexico be given a chance by majority 
vote to amend their constitution in this respect, be defeated. 

Not only can a minority in the House of Representatives defeat an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States desired by a 
majority of the States of this great Republic, and desired by a 
majority of the people of this Nation, but a minority in the Senate can 
do so and has done so for years, in the matter of the election of 
Senators by direct vote of the people, the income tax, the control of 
monopoly, the control of railways, etc., in spite of all party promises 
made when seeking majority votes. 






6 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


Not only can a minority in House and Senate defeat the will of the 
majority, but a minority of the States can do so under section \ of 
the Constitution of the United States. 

Even if two-thirds or more of the House and Senate submit a con¬ 
stitutional amendment, 13 States can nevertheless defeat 35 States 
under this undemocratic Constitution of the United States, because it 
requires three-fourths of the States to approve any constitutional 
amendment. The minority can thus deny the majority the right to 
rule, and the minority has done so most effectively during all these 
years. The Constitution of the United States was written for the 
actual purpose of protecting the minority against the majority. It 
was the belief then of the so-called “conservatives” that the people 
could not be trusted, and that egregious, false doctrine still survives 
in the minds of those who oppose the majority rule to-day, in the 
minds of those who oppose the people’s rule, and in the minds of those 
who oppose the initiative and referendum, the direct primary, the 
right of recall, corrupt-practices prevention acts, and the other agen¬ 
cies by which the people of this country are endeavoring to restore the 
rule of the majority, by which .they are endeavoring to establish the 
integrity of government and put an end to corruption. I wish to put 
on the records that corruption is always the agency of the minority, 
and never the agency of the majority. The majority do not need to 
resort to corrupt practices. It is only the crooked minority, seeking 
special privileges, moved by sordid motives, that need to resort to 
corrupt practices to defeat the honest majority. 

Moreover, not only has the rule of the minority been skillfully favored 
in the framing of the Constitution of the United States in the particu¬ 
lars named, but it has also been promoted by appointing Federal 
judges for life, without any expressed mode of recall either by the 
Executive or by the Congress of the United States, much less by the 
right of recall by a vote of the people. 

Under our system of government for the last 37 years, no political 
party has had complete control of government. No party, for 37 
years, has had full power, and therefore full responsibility to the 
people, but a minority has always been in position to obstruct the 
majority and prevent them from exercising the full powers of respon¬ 
sible government. Thus , 'party government has been made ineffi¬ 
cient, and inefficient party government has of necessity made the 
people of the country lose the active interest they should have in party 
control and guidance. 

A minority has been able thus always to defeat any treaty proposed 
by a majority, and a minority did defeat all the reciprocity treaties 
which were negotiated in the days of McKinley. The Democratic 
Party, when it was supposed to be in power in the days of Cleveland, 
was, in fact, powerless, being overthrown by a few men claiming that 
they were Democrats, who, in fact, were in collusion with the minority. 
Since 187If. there were but two years (the Fifty-first Congress) during 
which any party had a majority in all branches of the Government , 
and even then a two-thirds majority in the Senate ivas lacking 
necessary to pass treaties or amend the Constitution. 

I believe in the rule of the majority and am opposed to the rule of 
the minority, and for this very reason I believe that if a majority of 
the people of New Mexico wish to make their own constitution sub¬ 
ject to minority rule or if a majority of the people of Arizona desire 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


7 


to exercise the right of recall of judges they should have the right 
to do so, and if the people of Arizona, by a majority, desire to give 
public hearing and expression of public opinion on a proposed 
amendment of their own constitution, where 15 per cent of their 
voters initiate such proposal, I believe the people of Arizona should 
have that right and should not be denied the right because a citizen 
or Senator from Minnesota entertains the contrary view. I believe 
the people of Minnesota should have the right to govern themselves 
by a majority vote, and that they should not be denied the right to 
govern themselves by a majority vote, even if a minority in the State 
entertains a contrary opinion or even if a Senator from some other 
State objects. 

EITHER THE MAJORITY OR THE Ml NOR IT'' MUST RULE. 

Either the majority or the minority must rule, and it is the uni¬ 
versal verdict of democracy that the majority should rule, and the 
universal practice of plutocracy and the special interests to favor 
minority rule. The advocates of special privilege everywhere dis¬ 
tinguish themselves by violent opposition to majority rule, and they 
hark back to the days of Athens to demonstrate the fatal effects of 
what they call “pure democracy.” They go back to the days when 
one person out of 400 could read and write, as a fair example of what 
should be expected in a Republic when 350 out of 400 can read and 
write. The ratio of error in their precedent is about 350 to 1, and 
their argument “has other faults.” The people of the United States,, 
and of Arizona, can nearly all read and write, and this general intel¬ 
ligence is so widely distributed that probably not a single individual 
suffers from unavoidable ignorance, because even if there were found 
a person who can not read and write he has immediate friends and 
acquaintances who can read and write and who can answer his every 
reasonable question. 


THE RECALL OF JUDGES. 

I favor recognizing the right of the people of Arizona to recall their 
judges by a majority vote of the people in whose service these judges 
are employed and by whom these judges are paid for their services. 
California has declared in favor of this right of recalling judges by 
an overwhelming vote—35 to 4—in the California Senate and I 
believe by a vote of 75 to 0 in the Lower House. The judges in 
California favor it. Oregon has long since adopted it, the judges in 
Oregon favor it, and the people have never abused it. The trouble 
with those who oppose majority rule is that the} 7 do not trust the 
people. They believe that the people will abuse the right of recall¬ 
ing judges. It is true that the people in 36 States directly elect the 
judges, and in 43 States have fixed a short tenure automatically 
recalling judges in this way. In almost every State in the Union the 
people are conceded to have abundance of intelligence to justify them 
in nominating and in electing judges. With what logic will you 
deny the people the right to disapprove and recall those whom they 
have sufficient intelligence to nominate and elect ? Do you prefer the 
machine nomination of judges and life tenure to the nomination of 
judges by a majority of the people, with the right of recall ? Judges 




8 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


are notoriously nominated by machine methods in many. of the 
States, and machines are controlled not only by minorities, but 
often by unscrupulous and corrupt minorities. Even such judges 
should not be irresponsible to the people, but the} r should be subject 
to recall and are recalled by short tenure or by the general assembly 
in every State in the Union. 

I have heretofore pointed out the grave extent to which judges 
on the bench are influenced by their previous predilections and by 
their environment. I called the attention of the Senate recently 
(on June 1, 1911) to the remarkable record of the Electoral Com¬ 
mission of 1877, where 5 great Supreme Court Justices, 5 eminent 
United States Senators, and 5 distinguished Members of the House of 
Representatives—15 in all—on four great election cases, with a 
voluminous record involving many inclependent questions, showed 
the remarkable result that every single one of the 15 men was con¬ 
trolled by his previous political predilection, and differed from each 
other in every case by this invariable law, seven saying that eight 
were wrong and eight saying that seven were wrong on every ques¬ 
tion raised, and every one of the fifteen controlled by the view of his 
own party. What better evidence do you wish that honest men on 
the bench may be so moved by their environment or by their previ¬ 
ous sympathetic relations with special interests that they may prove 
to be unacceptable or unserviceable to the people who engage them 
as public servants? I regard it as gross error to treat a judge on the 
bench as anything but a fallible human being capable of degeneration 
mentally, morally, and physically like any other human being. I 
regard it as gross error to promote the doctrine of “ judicial infalli¬ 
bility.” 

You never find any supreme court in any State, and you never 
find any Supreme Court of the United States, but what decides 
questions of the greatest importance by a divided court, in which 
approximately one half of the judges express their opinion that the 
other half of the judges are wrong; and, taking the judgment of the 
individual members of the Supreme Court of the United States itself 
as a guide, we are easily able to ascertain that not a single one of 
the members of that bench are ever uniformly right, according to 
the excellent opinion of their own colleagues. The highest testi¬ 
monial against judicial infallibility comes from the membership of 
the Supreme Court of the United States itself. The judgment of 
the majority of the people of the State on a question is more apt to 
be right than the judgment of any five or seven men that compose 
the supreme court of any State in the Union. The body of the peo¬ 
ple know more than a dozen lawyers do. They have a greater 
knowledge. They are “safer and saner.” Their conservative, just, 
and wise judgment can be relied upon. Permitting the majority 
to rule uncorrupted is far better than promoting the rule of the 
minority. Judges on the bench may become insane, despotic, 
mentally unbalanced, inefficient, unserviceable, or corrupt—the 
majority of the people never. 

The Federal courts have violated the Constitution of the United 
States in many particulars. On four different occasions the proposal 
was made in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to permit the 
Supreme Court of the United States to pass upon the constitutionality 
of taws of Congress, and it was four times emphatically refused, never 



ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


9 


receiving exceeding the vote of the representatives of three States, and 
yet in numberless cases the Supreme Court of the United States has 
declared invalid and unconstitutional various laws of Congress, some 
of them laws of the highest importance, intended to protect the people 
of tins country against the aggression of monopoty. The Sherman 
antitrust law has been emasculated; the Interstate Commerce Com¬ 
mission has had its power greatly diminished; and the efforts made 
to control monopoly by Congress have been in large measure nullified. 
We have been slowly drifting toward judicial oligarchy, and the peo¬ 
ple of Arizona are absolutely right to stand firmly for the control of 
their judges, although the sacrifice may make their friends hesitate. 

INITIATING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. 

Fifteen per cent of the voters of Arizona may initiate a constitu¬ 
tional amendment under their constitution. If they have i00,000 
voters, 15,000 citizens are regarded as a number sufficiently respect¬ 
able to justify the people of the State in considering their proposal 
and voting upon it. 

One citizen of the United States can come to a Senator of the 
United States and ask him to initiate a bill to be passed on by the 
Congress of the United States for ninety millions of people. One 
person out of ninety millions can initiate legislation in the Congress 
of the United States; but the Arizona rule applied to the United 
States, with its ninety millions of people, would require 2,700,000 
voters to initiate a bill proposing an amendment to the Constitution 
for submission to the vote of the people. 

Any Senator who rises and makes a motion initiates a legislative 
act. Why should 15 per cent of the citizens of the State be denied 
the right to be heard upon a petition and to have a. vote of the people 
of the State upon it? One of the fundamental rights of the Decla¬ 
ration of Independence and of the Constitution of the United States 
is the right of petition. Will Senators insist upon the right of peti¬ 
tion and yet assert that no responsible answer shall be made to the 
petition? The only responsible answer to a petition to change the 
Constitution is to vote upon it. 

Oklahoma has a similar provision for the amendment of its con¬ 
stitution. It has not abused it. Oregon has a like provision, and 
the people in every instance have acted with invariable wisdom in 
voting upon proposals initiated in this way. It has been economical 
and has met with overwhelming public approval. 

The initiative and referendum, as a doctrine of government, has 
now been adopted in the organic law of eight States—Montana, South 
Dakota, Oregon, Maine, Oklahoma, Missouri, Arkansas, and Nevada. 
During the last winter eight more States—California, Washington, 
Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Florida— 
have declared in favor of the initiative and referendum. The people 
of Illinois voted for it by a vote of over 4 to 1. The people of Utah 
voted in favor of it. Both parties in Idaho, Kansas, Illinois, and 
Wisconsin declared in favor of it. The Democratic Party declared 
for it in Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, and Ohio. Governor 
Foss of Massachusetts made his campaign upon it and won. It is an 
active issue in almost every State in the Union—in New Jersey, Mary¬ 
land, North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Louisiana*, New Mexico, Mich- 


10 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


igan, Virginia, Wisconsin, etc. In Pennsylvania the judiciary com¬ 
mittees of senate and house favorably reported it, and the Keystone 
Party, with Berry as candidate for governor on this issue received 
384,000 votes and was probably only defeated by the fraudulent 
count of the machine. 

The initiative, referendum, and recall is a recognized part of the 
improved method of governing cities by the commission plan, which 
has been adopted or approved by nearly 200 cities in 27 States 
within the last two years. 

I approve the constitution of Arizona for the very reason that it 
contains the initiative and referendum and recall. This matter has 
been heretofore set forth in the Senate by the Hon. Jonathan Bourne, 
jr., on May 5, 1910 (Record, vol. 45, pp. 5823-5830); by myself on 
May 31, 1910, and March 4, 1911 (Record, vol. 46, pp. 4290-4319); 
by Senator George Chamberlain on April 17, 1911 (Record, vol. 47, 
pp. 381-390); and by Senator Works, of California, on April 20, 1911 
(Record, vol. 47, pp. 615-622), to which respectful reference is made 
for the benefit of those who may not have given this matter atten¬ 
tion. I call attention again to Senate Documents Nos. 603 and 624 
of the Sixty-first Congress, and especially to the explanation given 
by Prof. Lewis Johnson, of Harvard University, presented by me as 
an exhibit to my remarks on the admission of Arizona and New 
Mexico on March 4, 1911. (Record, vol. 46, pp. 4303.) 

Very respectfully submitted. 

R. L. Owen. 


Exhibit A. 

MANNER OF ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES IN THE RESPECTIVE STATES AND 

TENURE OF OFFICE. 

Alabama, 1901 (sec. 152 , art. 6). —“Elected by the qualified electors of the State.” 
Term of five years. 

Arkansas, 1874 (sec. 6, art'. 7 ).—“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected 
by the qualified electors of the State, and shall hold their offices during the term of 
eight years.” 

California, 1879 (sec. 3, art. 6). —“The chief justice and the associate justices shall 
be elected by the qualified electors of the State at large * * * two of them shall 
go out of office at the end of four years, two of them at the end of eight years, and two 
of them at the end of twelve years.” 

Colorado, 1876 (sec. 6, art. 6). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by 
electors of the State at large.” Term of nine years. 

Connecticut, 1818 (sec. 3, art. 5 ).—“The fudges of the supreme court of errors, of the 
superior and inferior courts * * * shall be appointed by the general assembly 
* * *. The judges of the supreme court and the superior court shall hold their 
offices during good behavior.” Amendment 1856: “The judges of the supreme court 
of errors, and of the superior court, appointed in the year 1855, and thereafter, shall 
hold their offices for the term of eight years. 

Delaivare, 1897 (sec. 3, art. 4). —“The chancellor, chief justice, and associate judges 
shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the consent of the majority of all the 
members elected to the senate, for the term of twelve years.” 

Florida, 1885 (sec. 2. art. 5). —“The supreme court shall consist of three justices who 
shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State * * * and shall hold their 
office for the term of six years.” 

Georgia, 1877 (par. 4, art. 6). — Elected by the general assembly for a term of six years. 

Idaho, 1889 (sec. 6, art. 5). —“The justices of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the electors of the State at large.” Term of six years. 

Illinois, 1870 (sec. 6, art. 6). —Members of the supreme court shall “be elected by 
the electors thereof in each district * * * for the term of nine years.” 





ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


11 


Indiana, 1851 (sec. 3, art. 7). —The judges of the supreme court “shall be elected 
by the electors of the State at large” and (sec. 2, art. 7) “shall hold their offices for 
six years, if they so long behave well.” 

Iowa, 1857 (sec. 3, art. 5). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the qualified electors of the State. * * * The term of each judge shall be six 
years.” 

Kansas, 1859 (sec. 2, art. 3). —“The supreme court * * * shall be chosen by 
the electors of the State.” “ The term of office * * * shall be six years.” 

Kentucky, 1890 (sec. 116). —“The judges of the court of appeals shall be elected by 
districts” and (sec. 112) “shall hold their offices for the term of eight years.” 

Louisiana, tenth amendment, 1904 (art. 86 ).—“They” (the chief justice and associate 
justices) “shall each be elected for a term of twelve years.” 

Maine, 1819 (sec. 8, art. 5). —“He” (the governor) “ shall nominate, and, with the 
advice and consent of the council, appoint all judicial officers.” (Sec. 4, art. 6.) 
“All judicial officers * * * shall * * * hold their offices for the term of 
seven years.” 

Maryland, 1867 (sec. 3, art. 4)- —“The judges of the said several courts shall be 
elected by the qualified voters in their respective judicial circuits * * * for the 
term of fifteen years.” 

Massachusetts, 1780 (art. 9, chap. 2). —“All judicial officers * * * shall be nomi¬ 
nated and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the coun¬ 
cil.” (Art. 1, ch. 3.) “All judicial officers * * * shall hold their offices during 
good behavior.” 

Michigan, 1850 (sec. 2, art. 6). —“A supreme court, * * * to consist of one chief 
justice and three associate justices, to be chosen by the electors of the State. * * * 
The term of office shall be eight years.” 

Minnesota, 1857 (sec. 3, art. 6). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected 
by the electors of the State at large, and their term of office shall be six years.” 

Mississippi, 1890 (sec. 145, art. 6 ).—“The legislature shall divide the State into three 
supreme court districts, and the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the 
senate, shall appoint one judge for and from each district.” (Sec. 149, art. 6.) “The 
term of office of the judges of the supreme court shall be nine years.” 

Missouri, 1875 (sec. 4, art. 6). —“The judges of the supreme court shall hold office for 
the term of ten years,” and (sec. 8) “one judge shall be elected at the general election 
in eighteen hundred and seventy-six, and one every two years thereafter.” 

Montana, 1889 (sec. 6, art. 8). —“The justices of the supreme court shall be elected 
by electors of the State at large.” (Sec. 7.) “The term of office * * * shall be 
six years.” 

Nebraska, 1875 (sec. 4, art. 6). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the electors of the State at large, and their terms of office * * * shall be six years.” 

Nevada, 1864 (sec. 3, art. 6). —“The justices of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the qualified electors of the State * * * and shall hold office for the term of six 
years.” 

New Hampshire, 1902 (art. 4-5). —“All judicial officers * * * shall be nominated 
and appointed by the governor and council; * * * and no appointment shall take 

place unless a majority of the council agree thereto.” (Art. 72.) “All judicial 
officers * * * shall hold their offices during hood behavior.” 

New Jersey, 1844 (par. 1, sec. 2, art. 7 ).—“Justices of the court of errors and appeals 
* * * shall be nominated by the governor , and appointed by him, with the advice 

and consent of the senate, * * * and * * * shall hold their offices for the 
term of seven years.” 

New York, 1894. —The justices of the supreme court are (secs. 1 and 5, art. 6) 
chosen “by the electors of the judicial districts.” (Sec. 4.) “The official terms of the 
justices of the supreme court shall be fourteen years.” 

North Carolina, 1876 (sec. 21, art. 4) —“The justices of the supreme court shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of the State * * *. They shall hold their offices 

for eight years.” 

North Dakota, 1899 (sec. 90, art. 4) .—“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected 
by the qualified voters of the State at large.” (Sec. 91.) “The term of office * * * 

shall be six years.” ; 

Ohio, 1851 (sec. 2, art. 4).—“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the electors of the State at large, for such term, not less than five years, as the general 
assembly may prescribe.” 

Oklahoma, 1907 (sec. 3, art. 7).—“The State shall be divided into * * supreme 
court judicial districts. * * * From each of said districts candidates for justices 
of the supreme court shall be nominated by political parties, or by petitioners of the 
respective districts, and such candidates shall be voted for by the qualified voters 


12 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


of the State at large. * * * The candidate from each district receiving the highest 

number of votes cast in the State * * * shall be declared the justice-elect in 
said district. * * * The term of office of the justices of the supreme court shall 
be six years.” 

Oregon, 1857 {sec. 2, art. 7). —“The supreme court shall consist of four justices, to 
be chosen in districts by the electors thereof.” (Sec. 3.) “One or more shall be 
chosen every two years, to serve for the term of six years.” 

Pennsylvania, 1873 {sec. 2, art. 5). —“The supreme court shall consist of seven 
judges, who shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State at large. They 
shall hokbtheir offices for the term of twenty-one years.” 

Rhode Island, 1842 {sec. 4, art. 10). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be 
elected by the two houses in grand committee. Each judge shall hold his office until 
his place be declared vacant by a resolution of the general assembly to that effect; 
which resolution shall be voted for by a majority of all the members elected to the 
house in which it may originate, and be concurred in by the same majority of the 
other house.” 

South Carolina , 1895 {sec. 2, art. 5). —“They” (the chief justice and associate jus¬ 
tices of the supreme court) “shall be elected by a joint viva voce vote of the general 
assembly for the term of eight years.” 

South Dakota , 1889 {sec. 5, art. 5). —“The supreme court shall consist of three judges, 
to be chosen from districts by qualified electors of the State at large.” (Sec. 8.) 
“The term of said judges shall be six years.” 

Tennessee, 1870 {sec. 3, art. 6). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected 
by the qualified voters of the State. * * * His term shall be eight years.” 

Texas {amendment adopted Sept. 22 , 1891, sec. 2). —“Chief justice and associate 
justices shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State at a general election; 
shall hold their offices six years.” 

Utah, 1895 {sec. 2, art. 8). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected by 
the electors of the State at large. The term of office * * * shall be six years. 

Vermont {amendment of 1870, art. 26). —The judges of the supreme court shall be 
•elected biennially, and their term of office shall be two years. (Art. 10 of amendments.) 
“Elected by the senate and house of representatives, in joint assembly.” 

Virginia, 1902 {sec. 91, art. 6 ).—“The judges of the supreme court of appeals shall 
be chosen by the joint vote of the two houses of the general assembly. * * * They 
shall be elected for the term of twelve years.” 

Washington, 1889 {sec. 3, art. 4). —“The judges of the supreme court shall be elected 
by the qualified electors of the State at large. * * * The terms of judges elected 
shall be six years.” 

West Virginia, 1872 {sec. 2, art. 8). —“They [the judges of the supreme court of 
appeals] shall be elected by the voters of the State and hold their offices for the term 
of twelve years.” 

Wisconsin {amendment of 1877, sec. 4). —“The supreme court * * * shall be 
elected by the qualified electors of the State * * * an d hold their offices * * * 
for the term of ten years.” 

Wyoming, 1889 {sec. 4,art. 5). —“The supreme court * * * shall be elected by 
the qualified voters of the State, * * * and their term of office shall be eight 
years.” 


Exhibit B. 

PROVISIONS IN THE RESPECTIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONS RELATING TO THE RECALL OF 

JUDGES. 

[Note.— The volumes and pages enumerated herein refer to Thorp’s “American Charters, Constitutions, 

and Organic Laws.”] 

ALABAMA. 

1819 .—“The judges of the several courts in this State shall hold their offices during 
good, behavior; and for willful neglect of duty, or other reasonable cause , which shall not be 
sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor shall remove any of them on the 
address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.” (Sec. 12, art. 5, vol. 
1, p. 107.) 

“The judges of the several courts of this State shall hold their offices for the term 
of six years, and for willful neglect of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not be 
sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor shall remove any of them on the address 
of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly .” (Amendment to the constitution 
of 1819, p. 115; first adopted Jan., 1830.) 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


13 


1865. —“The judges of the several courts of this State shall hold their offices for the 
term of six years; * * * but for any willful neglect of duty, or any other reasonable 
cause, which shall not be a sufficient ground of impeachment, the governor shall remove any 
judge on the address of two-thirds of each house of the assembly. ” (Sec. 12, art. 6, vol. 1, 
p. 129.) 

1867. —“The judges of the several courts of this State shall hold their offices for the 
term of six years; * * * but for any willful neglect of duty or any other reasonable 

cause which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the governor shall remove any 
judge on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly .” (Sec. 12, art. 
6, vol. 1, p. 143.) 

1875. —“The chancellors, judges of the circuit courts, judges of the probate courts, 
solicitors of the circuit and judges of inferior courts from which an appeal may be taken 
directly to the supreme court may be removed from office for any of the causes specified ” 
(habitual drunkenness, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude while 
in office, or committed under color thereof, or connected therewith) “&?/ the supreme 
court , under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” (Sec. 2, art. 7, vol. 1, 
p. 171.) 

1901. —Same as section preceding. (Sec. 174, art. 7, vol. 1, p. 208.) 


ARKANSAS. 


No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment . 

CALIFORNIA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 
Popular recall has passed legislature overwhelmingly. 

COLORADO. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 


CONNECTICUT. 

1818 .—“ The judges of the supreme court of errors, of the superior and inferior 
courts,’ and all justices of the peace, shall be appointed by the general assembly, 
* * * and the superior court shall hold their offices during good behavior, but 
may be removed by impeachment; and the governor shall also remove them on the 
address of two-thirds of the members of each house of the general assembly .” (Sec. 3, art. 
5, vol. 1, p. 543.) 

DELAWARE. 


IPg2 The chancellor and the judges of the supreme court, and of the court of 

common pleas, shall hold their offices during good behavior; but, for any reasonable cause 
which shall not be a sufficient ground for an impeachment, the governor may, in his discre¬ 
tion, remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of all the members of each branch oj 
the legislature .” (Sec. 2, art. 6, vol. 1, p. 575.) 

FLORIDA, 


1888. _“ The justices of the supreme court and the judges of the circuit courts shall 

be elected for the term of and during their good behavior; and/or willful neglect of duty, 
or other reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor 
shall remove any of them on the address of two-thirds or each house of the general assembly. 

^ 7 ^ 1 —^There ffiaU be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and con¬ 
sent of the senate, a chief justice and two associate justices of the supreme court of this 
State * * * for the term of six years * * * unless sooner removed under the 

provisions of this constitution for the removal of judges by^address^or impeachment; and 
for willful nealect of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground Jor 
wip^mment^ fa governor shall remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of the gen¬ 
eral assembly .” (Sec. 10, art. 5, vol. 2, p. 693.) 


GEORGIA. 


17 qo _“The judges of the superior court shall be elected for the term of three years , 

removable by the governor, on the address of two-thirds of both houses for that purpose, or 
by impeachment and conviction thereon.” (Sec. 1, art. 3, vol. 2, p. 798.) 


14 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


1819. —“The judges of the superior courts shall be elected for the term of three years 
and shall continue in office until their successors shall be elected and qualified; 
removable by the governor, on the address of two-thirds of both branches of the general 
assembly for that purpose , or by impeachment and conviction thereon.” (Sec. 1, art. 
3, vol. 2, p. 804.) 

1840. —“The supreme court shall consist of three judges, * * * for such term 
of years as shall be prescribed by law, and shall continue in office until their successors 
shall be elected and qualified, removable by the governor, on the address of two-thirds of 
both branches of the general assembly for that purpose , or by impeachment and conviction 
thereon.” (Sec. 1, art. 3, vol. 2, p. 806.) 

1865. —“The supreme court shall consist of three judges, who shall be elected by 
the general assembly for such term of years, not less than six, as shall be prescribed by 
law, and shall continue in office until their successors shall be elected and qualified; 
removable by the governor, on the address of two-thirds of each branch of the general assembly, 
or by impeachment and conviction thereon.” (Sec. 1, art. ,4, vol. 2, p. 818.) 

IDAHO. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

ILLINOIS. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

INDIANA. 

1816. —“The judges of the supreme court, the circuit, and other inferior courts shall 
hold their offices during the term of seven years, if they shall so long behave well.” 
(Sec. 4, art. 5, vol. 2, p. 1066.) 

1851. —“The supreme court shall consist of not less than three nor more than five 
judges. * * * They shall hold their offices for six years, if they so long behave well.” 
(Sec. 2, art. 7, vol. 2, p. 1084.) 

1851. —“Any judge or prosecuting attorney, who shall have been convicted of cor¬ 
ruption or other high crime, may, on information in the name of the State, be removed 
from office by the supreme court, or in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” 
(Sec. 12, art. 7, vol. 2, p. 1085.) 

IOWA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

KANSAS. 

1859. —“Justices of the supreme court and judges of the district courts may be 
removed from office by resolution of both houses, if two-thirds of the members of 
each house concur, but no such removal shall be made except upon complaint the 
substance of which shall be entered on the journal, nor until the party charged shall 
have had notice and opportunity to be heard.” (Sec. 15, art. 3, vol. 2, p. 1250.) 

KENTUCKY. 

1792. —“The judges of both the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices 
during good behavior; but for any reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground 
for impeachment , the governor may remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each 
branch of the legislature .” (Sec. 2, art. 5, vol. 3, p. 1270.) 

1799. —Same as section preceding. (Sec. 3, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1284.) 

1850. —“The judges * * * shall * * * hold their offices for eight years, 
* * * but for any reasonable cause the governor shall remove any of them on the address 
of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly .” (Sec. 3, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1300.) 

1890. —Same as preceding section. (Sec. 112, art. 13, p. 1331.) 

LOUISIANA. 

1812. —“The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices 
during good behavior; but for any reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground 
for impeachment, the governor shall remove any of them on the address of three-fourths of 
each house of the general assembly .” (Sec. 5, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1387.) 

1845. —“The judges of all courts shall be liable to impeachment; but for any reason¬ 
able cause , which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor shall remove 
any of them on the address of three-fourths of the members present of each house of the general 
assembly.” (Art. 73, title 4, p. 1401.) 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


15 


1852. Same as the section preceding. (Art. 73, title 3, p. 1420.) 

‘The judges of all courts shall be liable to impeachment; but for any reason¬ 
able cause, which shall not be sufficient cause for impeachment, the governor shall remove 
any oj them on the address oj a majority of the members elected to each house of the qeneral 
assembly .” (Art. 77, title 5, vol. 3, p. 1439.) 

1868. “The judges of all courts shall be liable to impeachment for crimes and 
misdemeanors. For any reasonable cause the governor shall remove any of them on the 
address of tuo-thirds of the members elected to the qeneral assembly.” (Art. 81, title 4, 
vol. 3, p. 1459.) 

1879 .—Same as section preceding. (Art. 93, vol. 3, p. 1485.) 

1898. “ For any reasonable cause, whether sufficient for impeachment or not, the governor 

shall remove any officer on the address of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of 
the general assembly .” (Art. 220, vol. 3, p. 1568.) 

MAINE. 

1819 .—“All judicial officers * * * hold their offices for the term of seven years 
from the time of their respective appointments (unless sooner removed by impeachment 
or by address of both branches of the legislature to the executive.)” (Sec. 4, art. 6, vol. 3 
p. 1659.) “Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed 
by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office may 
be removed by the governor, with the advice of the council, on the address of both branches 
of the legislature .” (Sec. 5, art. 9, vol. 3, p. 1662.) 


MARYLAND. 

1851. —“And one person * * * shall be elected from each of said districts 
* * * as a judge * * * subject to removal for incompetency, willful neglect of 
duty, or misbehavior in office, on conviction in a court of law, or by the governor upon 
the address of the general assembly two-thirds of the members of each house concurring in 
such address.” (Sec. 4, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1727.) 

-.—“ Any judge shall be removed from office by the governor on conviction, in a court 

of law, of incompetency, of willful neglect of duty, of misbehavior in office, or any other 
crime; or on impeachment according to this constitution, or the laws of the State; or on 
the address of the general assembly, two-thirds of each house concurring in such address.” 
(Sec. 4, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1760.) 

1867 .—“Any judge shall be removed from office by the governor on conviction in a 
court of law, of incompetency, of willful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office or any 
other crime, or on impeachment according to this constitution, or the laws of the 
State; or on the address of the general assembly, two-thirds of each house concurring in such 
address.” (Sec. 4, art. 4, vol. 3, p. 1799.) 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

1780—Judiciary power. —-All judicial officers, duly appointed, commissioned, and 
sworn, shall hold their offices during good behavior, excepting such concerning whom 
there is different provision made in this constitution: Provided, nevertheless, The 
governor, with consent of the council, may remove them upon the address of both 
houses of the legislature. 


MICHIGAN. 

I860 .—“ For reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for the impeachment 
of a judge , the governor shall remote him on a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of the 
members elected to each house of the legislature .” (Sec. 6, art. 12, vol. 4, p. 1960.) 

MINNESOTA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

MISSISSIPPI. 

1817.— ‘ The judges of the several courts of this State shall hold their offices during 
good behavior. And for willful neglect of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not 
be sufficient ground for an impeachment, the governor shall remove any of them on the 
address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.” (Sec. 9, art. 5, vol. 4, 
p. 2042.) 



16 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


1832 .—“ The judges of the several courts of this State, for willful neglect of duty or 
other reasonable cause, shall be removed by the governor on the address of two-thirds of both 
houses of the legislature .” (Sec. 27, art. 4, vol. 4, p. 2057.) 


MISSOURI. 

1875. — “In case of the inability of any judge of a court of record to discharge the duties 
of his office with efficiency, it shall be in the power of the general assembly, two-thirds of the 
members of each house concurring, with the approval of the governor, to remove such judge 
from office .” (Sec. 41, art. 6, vol. 4, p. 2252.) 

MONTANA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

NEBRASKA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

NEVADA. 

1864.—“For any reasonable cause, to be entered on the journals of each house, which 
may or may not be sufficient grounds for impeachment, the chief justice and associate justices 
of the supreme court and judges of the district courts shall be removed from office on the 
vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature.” (Sec. 3, art. 7, 
vol. 4, p. 2416.) 

NEW HAMPSHIRE. 

1784 .—“All judicial officers, duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn, shall hold 
their offices during good behavior, excepting those concerning whom there is a differ¬ 
ent provision made in this constitution: Provided nevertheless, The president, with the 
consent of council , may remove them upon the address of both houses of the legislature.” 
(P. 2466.) 

1792. —“ The president, with consent of the council, may remove them (all judicial officers) 
upon the address of both houses of the legislature.” (Sec. 73, p. 2486.) “ The governor , 

with consent of council, may remove them (all judicial officers ) upon the address of both 
houses of the legislature.” (Art. 72, vol. 4, p. 2509.) 

NEW JERSEY. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

NEW YORK. 

1846. — “ Justices of the supreme court and judges of the court of appeals may be removed 
from office by concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all 
members elected to the assembly and a majority of all members elected to the senate concur 
therein.” (Sec. 11, art. 6, vol. 5, p. 2664.) 

1894 .—“ Judges of the court of appeals and justices of the supreme court may be removed 
by concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all the members 
elected to each house concur therein.” (Sec. 11, art. 6, vol. 5, p. 2719.) 

NORTH CAROLINA. 

1876. — “Any judge of the supreme court or of the superior courts, and the presiding officer 
of such courts inferior to the supreme court as may be established by law, may be removed 
from office for mental or physical inability, upon a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of 
both houses of the general assembly.” (Sec. 31, art. 4, vol. 5, p. 2833.) 

NORTH DAKOTA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

OHIO. 

1851. — “Judges may be removed from office by concurrent resolutions of both houses of 
the general assembly if two-thirds of the members elected to each house concur therein.” 
(Sec. 17, art. 4, vol. 5, p. 2923.) 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


17 


OKLAHOMA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 


OREGON. 

. -1^57 • ^ governor, may remove from office & judge of the supreme court , or prosecut¬ 

ing attorney, upon the joint resolution of the legislative assembly, in which two-thirds of 
the members elected to each house shall concur, for incompetency, corruption, malfeasance , 
or delinquency in office , or other sufficient cause, stated in such resolution.” (Sec 20, 
art. 7, vol. 5, p. 3010.) 

Article II, section 18, of the Oregon constitution provides: 

“ Every public officer in Oregon is subject, as herein provided, to recall by the legal 
voters oj the State or of the electoral district from which he is elected. There may be 
required 25 per cent, but not more, of the number of electors who voted in his district 
at the preceding election for justice of the supreme court to file their petition demand¬ 
ing his recall by the people. They shall set forth in said petition the reasons for said 
demand. If he shall offer his resignation it shall be accepted and take effect on the 
day it is offered, and the vacancy shall be filled as may be provided by law. If he 
shall not resign within five days after the petition is filed, a special election shall be 
ordered to be held within 20 days in his said electoral district to determine whether 
the people will recall said officer. On the sample ballot at said election shall be 
printed in not more than 200 words the reasons for demanding the recall of said 
officer as set forth in the recall petition, and in not more than 200 words the officer’s 
justification of his course in office. He shall continue to perform the duties of his 
office until the result of said special election shall be officially declared. Other 
candidates for the office may be nominated to be voted for at said special election. 
The candidate who shall receive the highest number of votes shall be deemed elected 
for the remainder of the term, whether it be the person against whom the recall 
petition was filed or another. The recall petition shall be filed with the officer with 
whom a petition for nomination to such office should be filled, and the same officer 
shall order the special election when it is required. No such petition shall be circu¬ 
lated against any officer until he has actually held his office six months, save and 
except that it may be filed against a senator or representative in the legislative assem¬ 
bly at any time after five days from the beginning of the first session after his election. 
After one such petition and special election no further recall petition shall be filed 
against the same officer during the term for which he was elected unless such further 
petitioners shall first pay into the public treasury which has paid such special election 
expenses the whole amount of its expenses for the preceding special election. Such 
additional legislation as may aid the operation of this section shall be provided by 
the legislative assembly, including provision for payment by the public treasury of 
the reasonable special election campaign expenses of such officer. But the words 
‘the legislative assembly shall provide,’ or any similar or equivalent words in this 
constitution or any amendment thereto, shall not be construed to grant to the legis¬ 
lative assembly any exclusive power of law making nor in any way to limit the 
initiative and referendum powers reserved by the people.” 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

1790. —“ The judges of the supreme court, and of the several courts of common pleas, 
shall hold their offices during good behavior. But for any reasonable cause, which shall 
not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the governor may remove any of them on the 
address of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature .” (Sec. 2, art. 5, vol. 5, p. 2097.) 

“ Justices of the peace * * * shall be commissioned during good behavior, but 
may be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office, or of any infamous crime, or on the 
address of both houses of the legislature .’’’ (Sec. 10, art. 5, vol. 5, p. 3098.) 

“ The judges of the supreme court shall hold their offices for the term of fifteen years 
if they so long behave themselves well. The present judges of the several courts of com¬ 
mon pleas, and of such other courts of record, * * * shall hold their offices for a term 
of ten years , if they so long behave themselves well. The associate judges of the courts of 
common pleas , shall hold their offices for the term oifive years, if they shall so long behave 
themselves well , but for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground of 
impeachment, the governor may remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each 
branch of the legislature .” (Sec. 2, art. 5, vol. 5, p. 3109.) . 

1873 .— “ The supreme court shall consist of seven judges, they shatt hold their 
offices for the term of twenty-one years, if they so long behave themselves well.” (Sec. 
2, art. 5, vol. 5, p. 3133.) 

S. Rept. 100, 62-1, pt, 2-2 



18 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


“All judges shall hold their offices for the period of ten years, if they shall so long 
behave themselves well; but for reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for 
impeachment, the governor may remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each 
house of the general assembly.” (Sec. 15, art. 5, vol. 5, p. 3135.) 

RHODE ISLAND. 

1842. — “ Each judge shall hold his office until his place be declared vacant by a resolution 
of the general assembly to that effect; which resolution shall be voted for by a majority 
of all members elected to the house in which it may originate and be concurred in by the 
same majority of the other house.” (Sec. 4, art. 10, vol. 6, p. 3232.) 

SOUTH CAROLINA. 

1778. —‘ ‘That all other judicial officers , excepting officers of the peace, shall be chosen 
by ballot jointly by the senate and house of representatives and, except the judges of the 
court of chancery, commissioned by the governor and commander in chief during good 
behavior, but shall be removed on the address of the senate and house of representatives.” 
(Sec. 27, vol. 6, p. 3254.) 

1868. — 11 For any willful neglect of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not be 
sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor shall remove any executive or judicial 
officer on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.” (Sec. 4, art. 7, 
vol. 6, p. 3297.) 

1895. —Same as preceding section. (Sec. 4, art. 15, vol. 6, p. 3342.) 

SOUTH DAKOTA. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

. » , j v* v ‘*;4 A t ~ •' *’ ’ ‘ ' s - * 

TENNESSEE. 

1834 .—“ Judges and attorneys for the State may be removed from office by a concurrent 
vote of both houses of the general assembly, each house voting separately; but two-thirds of 
all members elected to each house must concur in such vote.” (Sec. 6, art. 6, vol. 6, p. 
3435.) 

1870. —Same as section preceding. (Sec. 6, art. 6, vol. 6, p. 3462.) 

TEXAS. 

1845. —“ The judges of the supreme court and district shall be removed by the governor, 
on the address of two-thirds of each house of the legislature, for willful neglect of duly or other 
reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient grounds for impeachment.” (Sec. 8, art. 4, 
vol. 6, p. 3554.) 

UTAH. 

1895. —“ Judges may be removed from office by the concurrent vote of both houses of the 
legislature, each voting separately; but two-thirds of the members to which each house may 
be entitled must concur in such vote. ’ ’ (Sec. 11, art. 8, vol. 6, p. 3716.) 

VERMONT. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

VIRGINIA. 

1830. —“ Judges may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both houses of the 
general assembly; but two-thirds of the members present must concur in such vote, and the 
cause of removal shall be entered on the journals of each.” (Sec. 7, art. 5, vol. 7, p. 3828.) 

1864-—“Judges may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both houses of the gen¬ 
eral assembly, but a majority of all members elected to each house must concur in such vote; 
and the cause of removal shall be entered of the journal of each.” (Sec. 16, art. 6, 
vol. 7, p. 3868.) 

1870. —“ Judges shall be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both houses of the 
general assembly, but a majority of all the members elected to each house must concur in such 
vote, and the cause of removal entered on the journal of each house.” (Sec. 23, art. 6, vol 
—, p. 3890.) 

1902. —Same as preceding section. (Sec. 104, vol. 7, p. 3925.) 


ADMISSION OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO. 


19 


WASHINGTON. 

1889 .—“ Any judge of any court of record, the attorney general, or any 'prosecuting attor¬ 
ney may be removed from office by joint resolution of the legislature, in which three-fourths 
of the members elected to each house shall concur, for incompetency, corruption, mal¬ 
feasance, or delinquency in office, or other sufficient cause stated in such resolution.” 
(Sec. 9, art. 4, vol. 7, p. 3985.) 


WEST VIRGINIA. 

1863 .—“ Judges may be removed from office for misconduct, incompetence, or neglect 
of duty, or on conviction of an infamous offense, by the concurrent vote of a majority 
of all the members elected to each branch of the legislature, and the cause of removal shall 
be entered on the journals.” (Sec. 13, art. 6, vol.7, p. 4025.) 

1872 .—“ Judges may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both houses of the 
legislature, when from age, disease, mental or bodily infirmity, or intemperance, they are 
incapable of discharging the duties of their office. But two-thirds of all the members elected 
to each house must concur in such vote and the cause of removal shall be entered upon the 
journal of each house.” (Sec. 17, art. 8, vol. 7, p. 4052.) 

WISCONSIN. 

1848.—“Any judge of the supreme or circuit court may be removed from office, by 
address of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all members elected to each house 
concur therein.” (Sec. 13, art. 7, vol. 7, p. 4088.) 

WYOMING. 

No express provision relating to recall of judges, except impeachment. 

D 



LIBRARY 


F CONGRESS 



A 


0 033 239 191 4 


J 














